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An experiment is a scientific investigation that estimates the effect that a well-defined 
treatment has on a well-defined and pre-selected outcome. To estimate the effect of this 
treatment, the groups of treated and untreated units must be comparable. The most powerful 
method of achieving this (on average and in large samples) is to randomize which units 
receive treatment and which do not.1 The randomization then serves as the assignment 
mechanism (Imbens and Rubin 2015, chap. 3). When studying people, we must often also 
allow for the possibility that not all people behave as we had intended them to behave in the 
design of the experiment. Then, it is necessary to analyze who complies with their assigned 
treatment and who does not, i.e. the mechanism determining reception of the treatment.  
In summation, an experiment consists of (at least) four different aspects:  
• a well-defined outcome, 
• a well-defined treatment, 
• a mechanism for assignment to the treatment, 
• and the mechanism determining reception of the treatment. 
 
Although the use of controlled experiments is increasing in economics2, the use of  
so-called “natural experiments” is far more common. The idea behind natural  
experiments is “to exploit situations where the forces of nature or government policy have 
conspired to produce an environment somewhat akin to a randomized experiment” (Angrist 
and Krueger 2001, 73). These environments are then thought to be able to “assign the 
variable of interest randomly” (Angrist and Krueger 2001, 72; see also, for example, Angrist 
and Pischke 2008, 21, 151–152). In turn, this makes it possible to treat the data as if they 
were the result of a randomized experiment, thereby allowing us to estimate causal effects. 
Natural experimental situations are most often used as the basis for instrumental variables 
(IVs). Most applications of such instruments in economics—and social sciences in general—
only allow us to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE, Imbens and Angrist 1994; 
Angrist and Imbens 1995; Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996). This can—and often will—
differ from the average treatment effect for the population; however, it can still be of interest  
(for example, Imbens 2010). We can only estimate the LATE because, most often, we have 
 
1 Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have recently been criticized for both inherent weaknesses and common 
shortcomings in applications. Despite these issues, they are an indispensable tool for science (for criticism and 
defense of RCTs, see the contributions in Kawachi, Subramanian, and Mowat (2018). 
2 As exemplified by the work of the 2019 laureates of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences: Esther 
Duflo, Abhijit Banarjee, and Michael Kremer. 
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less than perfect compliance with the assignment and because the effect of the treatment 
varies across units (i.e. heterogeneous treatment effects). 
It is well known that, when we estimate a LATE, we estimate the effect for the group for 
which the treatment level is changed from their assignment to treatment by the instrument. 
I argue that an important consequence of this fact has been overlooked in the literature.  
To evaluate which group has had their treatment changed by being assigned to treatment 
(i.e. the compliers), we must determine how and why the assignment changes the treatment 
(for example, Angrist and Krueger 2001, 73). This requires a clear and unambiguous 
definition of the treatment that is based on the mechanism through which the instrument 
affects the treatment (or variable) of interest. However, such definitions are missing from 
most of the literature using natural experiments. This is problematic because such definitions 
make it clear that there is a difference between the effect that we are estimating, the LATE, 
and the effect of the treatment (or variable) of interest. 
Because we are estimating the effect for the group that has their treatment level changed 
by being assigned to treatment, we are estimating the effect of that change. Notably, the 
effect of the change is different from the effect of the level of the treatment. The change in 
treatment is the result of the mechanism through which the instrument affects the treatment 
of interest, i.e. the mechanism determining reception of the treatment. This mechanism 
defines the specific treatment for which we estimate the effect. This specific treatment will 
be different from the treatment (or variable) of interest. Therefore, we cannot expect their 
effects to be the same. 
The mechanism creating the change in the treatment completely mediates the association 
between the instrument and the treatment of interest. However, this has the unfortunate 
consequence of delinking the instrument from the treatment of interest, causing IVs with 
this type of indirect effect on the treatment of interest to not assign it “as good as random”. 
Therefore, they will also be unable to solve any issues of endogeneity and results based on 
indirect IVs, such as those used to estimate LATEs, will be severely biased and/or 
uninterpretable. 
This issue has been overlooked in the existing literature, an issue that has led to many 
studies being fundamentally flawed. The literature has been overly focused on the assignment 
mechanism (see, for example, Imbens 2019, 30–31; see also, Dunning 2008). Finding an  
as-good-as-random assignment mechanism has been considered sufficient for a valid  
natural experimental situation despite it being well known (for example, Angrist, Imbens, 
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and Rubin 1996, 447) that a random assignment mechanism is not enough. Additional 
assumptions are required to estimate a LATE, such as the exclusion restriction and 
monotonicity. I argue that we must also be more careful when defining the experiment’s 
treatment3 and the process underlying the receipt of this treatment. In the words of Angrist 
and Krueger (2001, 73), a “good instrument [is] correlated with the endogenous regressor 
for reasons the researcher can verify and explain”. 
In this work, I use the example of the “Same sex instrument” proposed in Angrist and 
Evans (1998). This IV relates to the treatment of interest for reasons we can verify and 
explain. In this case, the reason is that some parents desire to have children of both sexes 
and have another child in an attempt to achieve this. This reason is an example of a 
completely mediating step between the IV and the treatment of interest. Moreover, because 
this IV has only an indirect effect on the treatment of interest, it does not solve the issues of 
endogeneity. In Section IV, I demonstrate this point using the potential outcomes framework 
and simulated data.  
To enable that analysis, we need a much clearer definition of the experiment’s treatment 
than the aforementioned reason. Furthermore, we must not only consider the reason but 
also the how and why this reason exists. There will always be several different possible 
interpretations of this. However, the different interpretations of the experiment’s treatment 
do not in any way change how the method works mathematically (for example, Greenland 
2017, 9). The method is quite simple in practice; we compare the units that are indicated by 
the instrument with the units that are not. Moving from that to estimating a causal effect is 
based on both the necessary assumptions and the interpretations. The different possible 
interpretations of the experiment’s treatment determine which units comply with their 
assignment. Therefore, the different interpretations also have varying consequences for how 
well the necessary assumptions are fulfilled (for example, Imbens 2019, 37).  
In Section IV, I will discuss four different interpretations of the experiment’s treatment 
for the Same sex IV and demonstrate how well the natural experiment works under the 
different interpretations. To precede the analysis, the conclusion is that the IV violates both 
the exclusion restriction and the independence assumption and/or produces meaningless 
and uninterpretable results. 
 
3 The requirement to have a clear and unambiguous definition of the treatment is also not anything new (for 
example, Rubin 1978, 39–40; Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996, 446). However, detailed conceptual 
interpretations remain missing from the literature applying natural experiments. 
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1. The Same sex Instrument as a Source of Exogenous Variation in the Number 
of Children in a Family 
Microeconomic studies of families examining the effect of the number of children on the 
parents or siblings represent examples of insufficient conceptual definitions leading to the use 
of natural experiments that are not valid. It has been assumed that these natural experiments 
provide estimates of the effect we are interested in rather than the effect of the variation created 
by the (random) assignment mechanism used as the basis for the natural experiment. 
This literature has heavily relied on two “natural natural experiments” (Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin 2000) to identify exogenous variation in the number of children: (1) the occurrence 
of multiple births (for example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980; Black, Devereux, and 
Salvanes 2005) and (2) the sex of the first-born child(ren) (Angrist and Evans 1996; 1998; 
Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser 2010). The idea behind the first natural experiment is that a 
multiple birth leads to an exogenous increase in the number of children in the family. The 
idea behind the second is that, as previously mentioned, some families desire to have children 
of both sexes. Therefore, if their first-born child(ren) are of the same sex, they will have 
another child even if they had not originally intended to. An alternative specification of this 
instrument that is often used in Asian populations is that families desire a boy and will go on 
to have another child if their firstborn is a girl.  
Generally, people have been found to behave as though they have this type of gender 
preference for their children. Norling (2018) modeled parents’ preferences over the sex of 
their children using a large number of birth history surveys from Africa, Asia, and the 
Americas. He concludes that sex preferences are more common than previously established 
and “influence the decision to have additional children for more than half of couples” 
(Norling 2018, 209). Notably, this type of preference is not only present in lower-income 
countries. For example, Miranda, Dahlberg, and Andersson (2018) found that parents in 
Sweden tend to prefer having children of both sexes. They show this using both revealed 
preferences from register data and responses to survey questions.  
Using census data from 51 countries, Bisbee et al. (2018) applied the Same sex instrument 
(first two children) to estimate the “the relationship between having a third child and a 
mother’s labor force participation”. They found that having two first-born children of the 
same sex is associated with a higher probability of having another child in 132 out of 139 
available country-year observations. They also found that the instrument has sufficient 
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predictive power in almost all cases, even though the average difference in the number of 
children is not large (the global average of the first-stage coefficients is 0.041 children). 
2. The Potential Outcomes Framework Applied to Instrumental Variables 
The potential outcomes framework provides ways to think about the defining features of 
experiments (Imbens and Rubin 2015; Morgan and Winship 2015; Imbens 2019).  
This framework can easily be extended to natural experiments and instrumental variables 
(e.g. Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996).  
An evaluation of a natural experiment using the potential outcomes framework is based 
on the four types of observations that are created by combinations of their (binary) 
assignment to treatment and (binary) treatment status.4 The four types are the compliers, the 
never-takers, the always-takers, and the defiers. When using empirical data, it is often 
impossible to conclusively determine which type a unit is. However, we can determine that 
they belong to one of two types (Table 1). Compliers are units that behave as we expect and 
intend in the experiment. They are treated when assigned to treatment and are not treated 
when not assigned. Conversely, units that do not behave as expected and intended are known 
as non-compliers. These are either treated even if not assigned to treatment (always-takers) 
or are not treated even if assigned to treatment (never-takers). Moreover, it is possible that 
there are units—referred to as defiers—that behave in the opposite manner to what is 
expected and intended. They are either treated because they are not assigned to treatment or 
are not treated because they are assigned to treatment. Estimation of LATE relies on the 
monotonicity assumption, in which we assume that there are no defiers. It is unlikely that 
defiers exist in the case of Same sex IVs, and I will ignore them in the following analyses. 
 
TABLE 1. THE FOUR TYPES OF OBSERVATIONS CREATED BY COMBINATIONS OF THEIR 
ASSIGNMENT TO TREATMENT AND TREATMENT STATUS 
  Indicated by the instrument? 
  Yes No 
Treated? 
Yes 
Compliers and  
Always-takers 
Always-takers  
(and Defiers) 
No 
Never-takers  
(and Defiers) 
Compliers and  
Never-takers 
 
4 Although the number of children in a family is not binary, the specific treatment investigated when using Same 
sex IVs is. A family either has or does not have another child in an attempt to have children of both sexes. 
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Due to the fact that I am using simulated data in this study, I know how the units would 
have behaved in other possible situations and I can therefore assign each unit to a type.  
While this is not the typical situation, it has the advantage of enabling me to evaluate the 
underlying assumptions. 
In the analyses, I compare the desired number of children and the prevalence of a 
preference for children of both sexes among the types as defined under the different 
interpretations of the experiment’s treatment. If the exclusion restriction and independence 
assumption are fulfilled, there should be no systematic differences between compliers  
(or non-compliers) that are assigned to treatment and those that are not assigned to 
treatment. This was evaluated for the four different interpretations of the experiment’s 
treatment in Tables 2, 4, 5, and 6. The independence assumption implies that units assigned 
to treatment and those that are not should not differ in their (hypothetical) reactions to 
different assignments (“unconfounded types”) (Henderson et al. 2008, 171). Therefore, it 
should be equally likely for a unit to be a complier (or non-complier) whether or not it is 
assigned to treatment. These results are presented in Table 3 for all interpretations of the 
experiment’s treatment. 
3. Description of the Simulated Data 
As previously mentioned, I used a simulated population to evaluate the Same sex instrument. 
The starting point for the simulated data is a population of families with at least two births. 
For simplicity, I ignored multiple births. The families varied in how many children they want, 
originally desiring between two and nine children. The distribution of these preferences is a 
stylized mid-twentieth-century Scandinavian population based on Black, Devereux, and 
Salvanes (2005, tab. II), and Åslund and Grönqvist (2010, tab. 1).5 The majority of families 
(60 percent) in the population desired children of both sexes, whereas the rest were neutral. 
For 20 percent of the families desiring children of both sexes, this desire is so strong that it 
makes them have one more child than they had originally intended if the first two are of the 
same sex. For simplicity, the families in the simulation only had one more child in an  
attempt to have children of both sexes. This creates 141 different possible combinations of 
events and preferences leading to the families ending up with between two and ten children 
 
5 Half of the families (50.0 percent) desire two children, 33.3 percent desire three, 11.0 percent desire four, 4.0 
percent desire five, 1.2 percent desire six, 0.5 percent desire seven, 0.2 percent desire eight, and 0.1 percent 
desire nine (or more). 
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(average 2.8). These combinations are associated with a probability based on the distribution 
of preferences and events. For simplicity, it was equally likely for a family in the simulation 
to have a boy or a girl. This simulation allows me to present the originally desired number of 
children, the realized number of children, the share desiring children of both sexes, the share 
with a strong desire for children of both sexes, and the share of the population for each type 
using different interpretations of the experiment’s treatment. The results are the average for 
units with different combinations of events and preferences within each type that are 
weighted by the probability of each combination of events and preferences. The simulation 
and results are presented in full in the online appendix spreadsheet (available at: 
https://osf.io/84vs3/). 
4. Evaluating the Same sex IV Under Different Definitions of the Experiment’s 
Treatment 
The results of evaluating this and other natural experiments differ depending on what we 
define the experiment’s treatment to be. In the following section, I present the results for 
four different interpretations of this treatment for the Same sex IV: the first two children born 
being of the same sex (that is, using the assignment mechanism as the experiment’s 
treatment); having a third child in an attempt to have children of both sexes; having another 
child at any parity in an attempt to have children of both sexes; and having another child at 
any parity for any reason. 
A. The First Two Children Born are of the Same Sex as the Experiment’s Treatment 
If we interpret the experiment’s treatment as the first two children born being of the same 
sex, we are using the assignment mechanism as the treatment. In this case, we have a situation 
with perfect compliance because there can be neither never-takers nor always-takers. In this 
case, the natural experiment works well in the sense that the preferences are balanced 
between compliers assigned to treatment and those not assigned (Table 2); therefore, the 
exclusion restriction is met. The compliers assigned to treatment also end up with a slightly 
larger number of children, thus implying that the instrument is relevant. Units that are 
assigned to treatment and not assigned to treatment have the same likelihood of being 
compliers (p = 1.000 in both cases) (Table 3). Therefore, the independence assumption is 
also fulfilled. 
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The problem with using the assignment mechanism as the experiment’s treatment is that 
we are then estimating the intention-to-treat effect. This effect has little in common with the 
causal effect of the number of children that we are interested in estimating. It is also not a 
valid natural experiment because the consequences of the experiment’s treatment are not the 
same for everyone. Having the first two children of the same sex will have different 
consequences for different families. This violates the second part of the stable unit treatment 
value assumption (SUTVA, Imbens and Rubin 2015, 11; see also, Cox 1958, 17–21).  
This part of the SUTVA is an assumption related to the treatment itself. However, Imbens 
and Rubin (2015) suggest that it should be evaluated by thinking about whether the outcome 
would be the same regardless of which version of the treatment a unit receives. The outcome 
would not be the same for the different versions of the treatment if we use this interpretation 
of the experiment’s treatment. 
B. Having a Third Child to Try to Mix Sexes as the Experiment’s Treatment 
A more empirically interesting interpretation of the experiment’s treatment is to use 
compliance as the treatment; that is, having a third child in an attempt to have children of 
both sexes if the first two children born are of the same sex. However, when we make this 
change in the interpretation, the natural experiment is no longer valid because the IV violates 
the exclusion restriction due to systematic differences in the preferences of the compliers 
assigned to treatment and those not assigned (Table 4). Moreover, the realized number of 
children is larger among the units assigned to treatment due to the differences between the 
groups of compliers and because the never-takers have a larger realized number of children 
than compliers not assigned to treatment. Furthermore, the independence assumption is also 
no longer met (Table 3). 
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TABLE 2. EVALUATION OF THE SAME SEX IV WHEN THE EXPERIMENT’S TREATMENT IS 
DEFINED AS HAVING THE FIRST TWO CHILDREN BORN OF THE SAME SEX 
Panel A. The parents’ desired number of children 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?:  
First two children of the same sex? 
Yes 2.76 — 2.76 
No — 2.76 2.76 
Column average 2.76 2.76 Overall average = 2.76 
Panel B. The parents’ realized number of children 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?:  
First two children of the same sex? 
Yes 2.85 — 2.85 
No — 2.76 2.76 
Column average 2.85 2.76 Overall average = 2.80 
Panel C. Share of parents desiring children of both sexes 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?:  
First two children of the same sex? 
Yes 0.600 — 0.600 
No — 0.600 0.600 
Column average 0.600 0.600 
Share of population = 
0.600 
Panel D. Share of parents with a strong desire to have children of both sexes 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?:  
First two children of the same sex? 
Yes 0.120 — 0.120 
No — 0.120 0.120 
Column average 0.120 0.120 
Share of population = 
0.120 
Panel E. Share of the population in each category 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row sum 
Treated?:  
First two children of the same sex? 
Yes 0.500 — 0.500 
No — 0.500 0.500 
Column sum 0.500 0.500 Total = 1.000 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the simulated population.  
  
  12 
TABLE 3. THE LIKELIHOOD OF BELONGING TO EACH TYPE WITHIN THE LEVELS OF 
THE INSTRUMENT 
 Compliers Never-takers Always-takers 
Treatment definition: 
Indicated by the 
instrument? 
Indicated by the 
instrument? 
Indicated by the 
instrument? 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
First two children of 
the same sex 
1.000 1.000 — — — — 
Having a third child to 
have both sexes 
0.060 1.000 0.940 0.000 — — 
Having another child at 
any parity  
to have both sexes 
0.084 1.000 0.916 0.000 — — 
Having another child 
after the first two 
0.560 0.500 0.440 0.000 0.000 0.500 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the simulated population.  
 
C. Having Another Child at Any Parity to Try to Mix Sexes as the Experiment’s Treatment 
We can also use the behavior that the natural experiment is based on as the experiment’s 
treatment. In this case, we interpret the treatment as having another child at any parity in an 
attempt to have children of both sexes. However, this interpretation again leads to a natural 
experiment that is not valid because both the exclusion restriction (Table 5) and the 
independence assumption (Table 3) are violated. 
D. Having Another Child at Any Parity for Any Reason as the Experiment’s Treatment 
We use the Same sex IV because we are interested in the causal effect of the number of 
children, or at least the causal effect of having another child. Thus, we aim to interpret the 
experiment’s treatment as having another child at any parity for any reason. Notably, we 
cannot use this interpretation of the treatment with the Same sex IV. The natural experiment 
is not valid because both the exclusion restriction (Table 6) and the independence 
assumption (Table 3) are violated. 
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TABLE 4. EVALUATION OF THE SAME SEX IV WHEN THE EXPERIMENT’S TREATMENT IS 
DEFINED AS HAVING A THIRD CHILD IN AN ATTEMPT TO HAVE CHILDREN OF BOTH 
SEXES 
Panel A. The parents’ desired number of children 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?:  
Have a third child to have both 
sexes? 
Yes 2.00 — 2.00 
No 2.81 2.76 2.79 
Column average 2.76 2.76 
Overall average = 
2.76 
Panel B. The parents’ realized number of children 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?:  
Have a third child to have both 
sexes? 
Yes 3.00 — 3.00 
No 2.84 2.76 2.80 
Column average 2.85 2.76 
Overall average = 
2.80 
Panel C. Share of parents desiring children of both sexes 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?:  
Have a third child to have both 
sexes? 
Yes 1.000 — 1.000 
No 0.574 0.600 0.588 
Column average 0.600 0.600 
Share of population 
= 0.600 
Panel D. Share of parents with a strong desire to have children of both sexes 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?:  
Have a third child to have both 
sexes? 
Yes 1.000 — 0.120 
No 0.064 0.120 0.093 
Column average 0.120 0.120 
Share of population 
= 0.120 
Panel E. Share of the population in each category 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row sum 
Treated?:  
Have a third child to have both 
sexes? 
Yes 0.030 — 0.030 
No 0.470 0.500 0.970 
Column sum 0.500 0.500 Total = 1.000 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the simulated population. 
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TABLE 5. EVALUATION OF THE SAME SEX IV WHEN THE EXPERIMENT’S TREATMENT IS 
DEFINED AS HAVING ANOTHER CHILD AT ANY PARITY IN AN ATTEMPT TO HAVE 
CHILDREN OF BOTH SEXES 
Panel A. The parents’ desired number of children 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?: 
 Another child at any parity 
to have both sexes? 
Yes 2.34 — 2.34 
No 2.80 2.76 2.78 
Column average 2.76 2.76 Overall average = 2.76 
Panel B. The parents’ realized number of children 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?:  
Another child at any parity 
to have both sexes? 
Yes 3.34 — 3.34 
No 2.80 2.76 2.78 
Column average 2.85 2.76 Overall average = 2.80 
Panel C. Share of parents desiring children of both sexes 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?: 
Another child at any parity 
to have both sexes? 
Yes 1.000 — 1.000 
No 0.563 0.600 0.583 
Column average 0.600 0.600 
Share of population = 
0.600 
Panel D. Share of parents with a strong desire to have children of both sexes 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?: 
Another child at any parity 
to have both sexes? 
Yes 1.000 — 1.000 
No 0.039 0.120 0.082 
Column average 0.120 0.120 
Share of population = 
0.120 
Panel E. Share of the population in each category 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row sum 
Treated?: 
Another child at any parity 
to have both sexes? 
Yes 0.042 — 0.042 
No 0.458 0.500 0.958 
Column sum 0.500 0.500 Total = 1.000 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the simulated population. 
  15 
TABLE 6. EVALUATION OF THE SAME SEX IV WHEN THE EXPERIMENT’S TREATMENT 
IS DEFINED AS HAVING ANOTHER CHILD AT ANY PARITY FOR ANY REASON 
Panel A. The parents’ desired number of children 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?:  
Another child at any parity 
to have both sexes? 
Yes 3.36 3.52 3.44 
No 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Column average 2.76 2.76 
Overall average = 
2.76 
Panel B. The parents’ realized number of children 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?:  
Another child at any parity 
to have both sexes? 
Yes 3.51 3.52 3.52 
No 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Column average 2.85 2.76 
Overall average = 
2.80 
Panel C. Share of parents desiring children of both sexes 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?: 
Another child at any parity 
to have both sexes? 
Yes 0.643 0.600 0.623 
No 0.545 0.600 0.574 
Column average 0.600 0.600 
Share of population 
= 0.600 
Panel D. Share of parents with a strong desire to have children of both sexes 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row average 
Treated?: 
Another child at any parity 
to have both sexes? 
Yes 0.214 0.120 0.170 
No 0.000 0.120 0.064 
Column average 0.120 0.120 
Share of population 
= 0.120 
Panel E. Share of the population in each category 
  Indicated by the 
instrument? 
 
  Yes No Row sum 
Treated?: 
Another child at any parity 
to have both sexes? 
Yes 0.280 0.250 0.530 
No 0.220 0.250 0.470 
Column sum 0.500 0.500 Total = 1.000 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the simulated population.  
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5. Explaining why the LATE does not Work as Intended 
My results show that the Same sex instrument is only valid if we use the assignment 
mechanism as the experiment’s treatment. Under this interpretation, the natural experiment 
still does not produce meaningful estimates of any effect because the experiment’s treatment 
then violates the second part of the SUTVA. Using other interpretations, the instrument 
violates both the exclusion restriction and the independence assumption. Notably, this is the 
same result as Öberg (2019) found when analyzing IVs based on multiple births. Both of 
these IVs have an indirect effect on the treatment of interest and represent examples of how 
this type of instrument does not work as previously thought. 
It might come as a surprise to the reader that estimates of the LATE do not function as 
intended, it was certainly a surprise to the author initially. However, this result is less 
surprising when we consider the causal structure of the problem. This is a case for which a 
directed acyclical graph (DAG, for example, Pearl and Mackenzie 2018) is a useful tool.  
Because we are interested in estimating the causal effect of a treatment of interest (X) on 
an outcome (Y), we require an instrumental variable (IV) to do this due to an unobserved 
confounder, 𝕌1. A relevant IV (Z) is related to the treatment of interest, X (edge f in Figure 1 
would not be crossed out). A valid IV is only related to the outcome through its effect on 
the treatment (edge d in Figure 1 is, and should be, crossed out). Moreover, there should not 
be any unobserved confounding of the instrument’s effects on the treatment or the outcome 
(as illustrated in Figure 1 by the absence of edges). 
 
FIGURE 1. A DIRECTED ACYCLICAL GRAPH ILLUSTRATING WHY LOCAL AVERAGE 
TREATMENT EFFECTS DO NOT WORK AS INTENDED 
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The thing that creates problems when we are estimating LATEs is that the IV, Z, does not 
have a direct effect on the treatment of interest, X. The IV is related to the treatment of 
interest through a change caused by a specific mechanism, dX, which is what affects the level 
of the treatment of interest. This specific mechanism, dX, completely mediates the effect of 
the IV on the treatment of interest. This has the consequence that, although the IV is valid 
as an instrument for dX, it is not valid for the treatment of interest. The intermediary, dX, 
delinks Z from X so that the effect of X|Z on Y will still be confounded by 𝕌1. 
The purpose of the IV is to estimate the effect of X on Y, not the effect of dX on Y.  
In fact, we do not want there to be any direct effect of dX on Y since such an effect would 
violate the exclusion restriction. Using the Same sex IV as an example, a direct effect  
of dX on Y could emerge if there was an effect on the outcome from the parents’ preferences 
for having children of both sexes.6  
The most controversial part of my argument is that there is no direct effect of the 
instrument on the treatment of interest (edge f is crossed out in Figure 1). In my opinion, 
the Same sex and multiple birth IVs are good illustrations of why we cannot consider the 
instrument to have a direct effect on the treatment of interest. Notably, neither having the 
first child(ren) born being of the same sex nor experiencing a multiple birth directly affects 
the number of children in the family. These events do not assign the value of this treatment 
of interest as good as random; however, what they can do is induce a change that can 
subsequently affect the value of the treatment of interest. Some families will have one more 
child than they had originally intended, which will affect the number of children in the family. 
Whereas the number of children in the family is a discrete variable that can take on several 
different values, these IVs are binary; either a family experienced the event used as the basis 
for the IV or not. This binary IV is related to a change that occurs in some families while 
not in others; in other words, a binary event. This change is the manipulation that we use as 
the basis for estimating a causal effect. However, because it is separate from the treatment 
of interest, we must take into account the extended causal structure illustrated in Figure 1 
when considering this type of IV.  
The mechanisms of change will be different for different IVs, although all IVs used to 
estimate a LATE will have this intermediary step between the IV and the treatment of 
 
6 In the case of IVs based on multiple births, a direct effect of dX on Y could emerge if there was an effect on 
the outcome from having two (or more) children being born at once instead of with some time in between. 
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interest. By definition, the LATE is the causal effect for the group that is influenced by the 
instrument and undergoes a change due to being assigned to treatment. Any other IVs that 
are only indirectly related to the treatment of interest, such as the one in Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson (2001), will also have to be evaluated using the extended causal structure 
presented in Figure 1. 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
When designing a natural experiment, it is equally important to have a clear and unambiguous 
definition of the experiment’s treatment as having an as-good-as-random assignment 
mechanism. A (natural) experiment is not defined by its assignment mechanism, but rather 
by all of its features. Different natural experiments can be designed based on the same 
(random) allocation mechanism. 
Although I criticize many previous applications of natural experiments, I certainly do not 
intend to invalidate the idea. The idea of utilizing natural experiments is a good one, though 
we must carefully define all aspects of such experiments. 
Both Angrist and Krueger (2001, 80) and Angrist and Pischke (2008, 7–8) quoted 
Haavelmo’s (1944) distinction between controlled and natural experiments.7 I find what 
follows immediately after the quoted distinction to be useful when considering all aspects of 
a natural experiment. 
A design of experiments[...] is an essential appendix to any quantitative theory. And we  
usually have some such experiment in mind when we construct the theories,  
although—unfortunately—most economists do not describe their designs of experiments 
explicitly. If they did, they would see that the experiments they have in mind may be 
grouped into two different classes, namely, (1) experiments that we should like to make to see 
if certain real economic phenomena—when artificially isolated from “other influences”—
would verify certain hypotheses, and (2) the stream of experiments that Nature is steadily 
turning out from her enormous laboratory, and which we merely watch as passive 
 
7 Haavelmo’s (1944) definition of experiments is broader than how we most often think about them.  
He considers experiments and the design of (hypothetical or real) experiments as being the link between theory 
and reality. They are what forces us to consider empirical definitions and measurements of the variables we 
include in our models. In his own words: “What makes a piece of mathematical economics not only 
mathematics but also economics is, I believe, this: When we set up a system of theoretical relationships and use 
economic names for the otherwise purely theoretical variables involved, we have in mind some actual experiment, 
or some design of an experiment, which we could at least imagine arranging, in order to measure those quantities 
in real economic life that we think might obey the laws imposed on their theoretical namesakes” 
(Haavelmo 1944, 6). 
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observers. In both cases the aim of theory is the same, namely, to become master of the 
happenings of real life. But our approach is a little different in the two cases. [...]  
In the second case [natural experiments] we can only try to adjust our theories to reality as 
it appears before us. And what is the meaning of a design of experiments in this case? It is 
this: We try to choose a theory and a design of experiments to go with it, in such a way that 
the resulting data would be those which we get by passive observation of reality. 
(Haavelmo 1944, 14) 
The last sentence covers both one of the most fundamental objections to estimates  
based on natural experiments—that they are not producing the results that are of theoretical 
interest (for example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000; Heckman 2005; Mogstad and 
Torgovitsky 2018)—and that which I argue has been missing from the literature: an explicit 
discussion of all aspects of the design of the experiment, (i.e. the assignment mechanism,  
the treatment, and the mechanism for the reception of treatment). 
We can and should continue to use natural experiments. However, we must use natural 
experiments that produce meaningful results even after we have adjusted our models and the 
(ex post) design of the experiments “in such a way that the resulting data would be those which 
we get by passive observation of reality” (Haavelmo 1944, 14). 
When we consider this (ex post) design, we must ensure that the IV has a direct effect on 
the treatment of interest. This precludes situations for which we are limited to estimating a 
LATE. Although this will certainly limit the number of valid natural experiments available, 
we will still be significantly helped by those that we are able to find. However, there remains 
a need to reconsider and correct the multitude of published studies that have estimated 
LATEs or have used IVs with an indirect effect on the treatment of interest. 
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